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Chapter 1
Introduction
In March 2013, the guardian published an article with a shocking title:
Is 2013 the Year of the Hacker?1. It states that 1.5 million peoples are
impacted by cyber attacks every day with an increasing rate and that even
industry giants like Facebook or Dropbox have been hit by cyber attacks.
Similar articles became common in international and national journals,
presenting the cyber crime, often associated with the term hacker or hacking,
as a rising and dangerous threat that may hit every person, society or nation.
Governments and industries are also showing a raising awareness to security
risks. Nowadays, the investment in cyber security defences is becoming
popular by promoting security researches, bug hunting and by developing
new standards.
The current cyber defence race is justified by the continuous cyber-
attacks that are massively performed since the Morris worm. Although the
most famous cyber security event of 2013 was the global surveillance disclo-
sure, when Edward Snowden leaked several top secret documents, several
cyber attacks were performed in the last year, for instance:
• Spamhaus attack: the second largest DDoS attack ever. Nine day
of DNS spoofing starting from March 18th (the primate for a DDoS
attack goes to the CloudFlare attack, dated February 10th, 2014 with
400Gbps).
• Department of Energy breach: performed in July, this data breach
was possible by exploiting backdoors installed after a previous attack
performed in February.
• Columbian Independence Day Attack: on July 20th, 30 Colom-
bian government websites were defaced or shut down.
• New York Times Attack: the Syrian Electronic Army targeted the
New York Times’ website in August 2013.
1http://guardian.co.tt/business-guardian/2013-03-11/2013-year-hacker
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• Adobe data breach: before the Snowden leak, it was the most fa-
mous data breach of 2013. In September, a successful attack took
millions of user credentials and, more important, source code of some
Adobe products.
• Data-Broker botnet: in September, a botnet was discovered in the
data-broker servers. The malware remained undetected from detection
systems for over a year.
The list could be expanded and not only with industrial giants or gov-
ernments, but also with average network users, infected by malware, be-
cause operating systems and software like browsers and PDF readers are
constantly analyzed to find exploitable bugs. Moreover, the massive diffu-
sions and connections of smartphones expanded the security context to both
mobile OSs and applications. One notorious example is Whatsapp, which
protocol has been hacked several times.
The increasing rate and scope of cyber attacks can be attributed to evo-
lution of computer technology, especially when dealing with internet con-
nectivity. Cloud computing and BYOD solutions, for instance, enlarged the
circle of thrust, creating situations that widen the attacker entry points and
making the defence work more difficult.
My work, however, doesn’t concern the study of new security solutions
in the context of new technologies, but in the study of strategies against tar-
geted attacks, which differ from the normal cyber attacks. While it may seem
that the cyber crime simply followed the technological evolution, the cost
reduction of resources, software development and the information spread-
ing led to new conceptual scenarios like hacktivism, industrial espionage
and cyber-warfare, where the attacker has a specific target to compromise.
Strictly speaking, they are not new scenarios, but the modern context en-
larged the actor set, by bringing targeted attacks within the reach of a wider
range of people.
Targeted attacks represent the major threat against companies, govern-
ments and military organizations. In the last few years, the term targeted
attack started to be used and now it’s becoming one of the major topic
in security communities. Many security solutions claim to offer protection
against targeted attacks and academic and professional researcher starts to
study the problem as well as approaches to detect and counter targeted
attacks.
This thesis aims to analyze differences between targeted and opportunis-
tic attacks, to examine existing defense approach and to propose some exten-
sions when dealing with targeted attacks. The method is then applied in the
real world, by performing analysis and mitigation of cyber-attacks performed
against an Italian company, which I will refer to as ACME Corporation.
Chapter 2
Cyber Attacks
This chapter describes what a cyber attack is and how it’s performed, by
analyzing existing taxonomies and common attack scenarios. Then oppor-
tunistic attacks and targeted attacks are compared, highlighting the main
differences between them.
2.1 Malware
A malware is any file containing executable code, such as binary files, scripts
and documents with active content (e.g. PDF), that performs malicious ac-
tions. They are used in cyber attacks, with various motivations (see sec-
tion 2.2). In this section, I describe types of malware and techniques com-
monly used by malicious programs.
2.1.1 Types of malware
Malware programs have been classified basing on the observed behavior in
the wild[10]. Each category isn’t mutually exclusive: modern malware have
a high level of complexity and exhibit multiple different behaviors. The
following list is intended to list features and strategies that can be seen in
malware programs:
Worm - A worm is an independent program that can propagate itself to
other machine, usually by means of network connection. The Morris
Worm, developed in 1986, was one of the first computer worm capable
of distributing over the internet[42]. Nowadays worms exhibit complex
behavior, for instance the Conficker worm propagate itself using flaws
of windows systems and creates a botnet used for malicious activities.
Conficker is also capable of updating itself to newer version[32].
Virus - A virus is a piece of code, incapable of running independently,
which adds itself to other programs in order to be executed[42]. Viruses,
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first developed between 1981-1983[1], don’t propagate through the net-
work; they rather infect files in network shares or removable media to
spread to other computers.
Trojan Horse - A trojan horse is program that executes a benign task,
but secretly performs a malicious behavior[1]. Trojan horses have been
reported since 1972, but they are common even now as the form of
browser plugin, downloadable managers, and so on[10]. A Remote
Access Trojan (RAT) is a trojan that installs a backdoor to allow a
remote control of the system.
Spyware - A spyware is a program, incapable of replication, which pas-
sively records and steals data from the infected host. A spyware may
steals usernames and password by using a passive keylogger, email ad-
dresses, bank accounts, software licence, and so on[1]. A less danger-
ous spyware, called adware, is a malware that steals market-oriented
information, such as visited websites.
Bot - A bot is a malware that allow the attacker to remotely control the
infected system[10]. Bots take orders from the command and control
center (aka C&C) and, for instance, can be used to deploy distributed
denial of service attacks (DDoS) or bitcoin mining.
Rootkit - A rootkit is a malware capable of hiding itself from user and
analysis application. It can operates at any level, user space, ker-
nel space or even by creating a virtual machine below the operating
system[10, 3].
Logic Bomb - A logic bomb is a program that executes a malicious pay-
load when a triggering condition becomes true[1]. For instance, the
trigger can be a date, the presence of a file or a mouse click (like the
Upclicker malware[41]).
Dropper - A dropper is a malware that drops other malware on the system.
The dropper can be persistent and continuously drop malware or it
can delete itself once the dropped content is installed.
Malware Toolkit - A toolkit is not malicious per se, but it’s capable of
generating malware versions by specifying desired features and behav-
ior, such as exploits and targeted. Famous malware toolkits are the
BlackHole Exploit Kit (which creator was arrested in 2013[26]) and
the Zeus Agent Toolkit.
2.1.2 Malware infection techniques
When designing a malware, the attacker must consider how to infect the sys-
tem, hide the malware from the user, detect defence systems and optionally
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evade them. For more details on malware analysis, see section 3.6.
In order to evade signature-based detection and static analysis, a mal-
ware can implement one or more of the following techniques:
Encryption - The malware body or part of it is usually encrypted, or
obfuscated, to hide the malicious code and to disrupt antivirus signa-
tures. The encryption can be static or use a key.
Oligomorphism - Oligomorphism is an improvement of encryption. At
each infection the malware changes the encryption key and/or the
encryption algorithm from a predefined set[1].
Polymorphism - A polymorphic malware implements the same concepts
of oligomorphism, but it uses dynamically generated encryption func-
tion, but modifying its code, by using a mutation engine[1]. The mu-
tation engine can operate in various ways, for instance by using equiv-
alent instruction, changing the used registers, by introducing concur-
rency, junk code or by inverting instructions.
Metamorphism - Metamorphism is the process of changing at each in-
fection the malware code, inclusive of the mutation engine itself. A
metamorphic malware doesn’t need to encrypt its body to evade sig-
natures, because the code itself is changed at every infection[1].
Packing - Packing is another approach to hide the malware code and to
evade signatures. The malware is compressed, encrypted and wrapped
by a second program called packer. The duty of the packer is to in-
stantiate a valid environment for the malware, by loading libraries,
creating memory segments and API wrappers. Then, the packer de-
crypts the malware and executes it without writing the code on the
disk. The packing operation doesn’t need a mutation engine or com-
plex encryption step for parts of the malware body. On the other
hand, an unpacked malware is vulnerable to dynamic analysis (see
section 3.6).
Encryption techniques are deployed also to thwart static binary analysis.
If strings, values and the malicious code are encrypted, the instruction flow
of the malware is nearly impossible to follow. To overcome these techniques,
modern defence systems perform dynamic analysis by executing the malware
inside an emulated system. In such cases, a malware have to detect the
emulated environment and to exhibit malicious code only in real machines.
This is a typical behavior of logic bombs: if the emulated environment is not
detected, then execute the malicious code is executed. Common dynamic
analysis evasion includes:
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Red pills - Red pills are detection methods, which exploit flaws in the CPU
emulation. A red pill invokes certain assembly instructions that are
known to produces different results inside the emulated environment.
System alternation detection - Emulated systems may present or lack
of devices, services or processes that are respectively missing or present
in real environment.
Sleeping malware - A simple counter action to automatic analysis is to
wait for it to finish. Real-time defence systems usually perform a time-
limited analysis. If the malware sleeps for long enough, the detection
could be bypassed.
Wait for user interactions - Like the Upclicker malware, a malicious ac-
tion could be triggered only when a user input is detected. In emulated
environment the human user is missing and the defence system can be
detected by the lack of its actions. Advanced defence systems emulate
user interaction to fool such behaviors.
Multi-stage attack - Multistage attacks are organized in a way that the
downloaded malware is not complete. Its infection process is divided
into multiple stages: at each stage the malware downloads another
component, which precedes the infection[24, 35].
2.2 Opportunistic and targeted attacks
When dealing with targeted attacks it’s important to identify when an attack
can be considered opportunistic and when targeted in order to distinguish
truly dangerous targeted attacks among the countless opportunistic events
that may resides in the network.
2.2.1 Opportunistic attacks
In opportunistic attacks, the attacker has a general idea of what to do and
chose its victim among the possible exploitable targets. Recurring motiva-
tions for opportunistic attacks may be:
• Build or expansion of an illegal infrastructure: the attacker wants to
build or extends an illegal infrastructure for phishing, spam or botnet.
The target is irrelevant since the desired outcome is to infect as many
hosts as possible.
• Financial gain: bitcoin mining, ransonware and credit card stealing
are common objective of opportunistic attackers.
• 15 minutes of fame: any vulnerable website or service is defaced or
taken down by a solo attacker or an organization.
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Opportunistic attacks’ scenarios have in common the absence of a specific
target, resulting in a large number of riskless attacks, as confirmed by the
Verizon data breach analysis[11, 20, 21, 22], which states that:
1. More than 70% of attacks as opportunistic.
2. On average, a system on the internet is scanned after 11 minutes from
the connection.
3. 97% of opportunistic attackers try one port and 81% send a single
packet
When the attack involves the use of malware, the malicious software
must be designed to infect a generic target, without a priori knowledge of
OS version and defence systems involved. It must also be fast to produce
to maximize the duty time between the zero-day and the bug correction.
Moreover, since the target is unknown, the attacker has to take in account
that the malware could infect a honeypot, or will be analyzed in sandboxes.
In order to avoid the automatic identification the malware must contain
anti-analysis techniques.
These problems led to the diffusion of malware toolkits that automatize
the malware generation. The result is a set of malware, equal in behavior but
with different signatures, which are generated every day by the thousands,
captured in honeypots and marked in a few weeks.
2.2.2 Targeted attacks
Targeted attacks differ from opportunistic because of the choice of the target.
This is the crux that influences every step of the attack process.
As first difference, motivations for targeted attacks share always an im-
plicit assumption: the attacker is not going to give up, since the objective
is reached only by attacking the specific target.
• Financial Gain: the attacker has financial benefits by stealing infor-
mation or by disrupting a service, for instance by executing a DoS on
the main web-site of the target.
• Activism: instead of money, emotions guide the attacker. The objec-
tive may be the same as the financial gain, but the attacker is driven
for instance by political or religious believes.
• Cyber warfare: the attacker launches an assault against a nation, tar-
geting strategic objective.
The second difference is the customization. Targeted attacks vector con-
tains evidence that the attackers has specifically selected the recipient of the
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attack [44]. Emails, for instance, contain evidence of an advanced knowledge
of the target beside address and name: format, terminology or the plausi-
bility of the content is a sign of strong information gathering. Also mal-
ware differs from opportunistic attacks. Targeted malware are specifically
designed to bypass the target defence systems and doesn’t belong to any
known family, thus, no signature is present. Unlike opportunistic attacks, a
targeted malware requires more skills for its design and development.
The third difference is organization. An opportunistic attack is an end
unto itself, while targeted attacks are usually part of an attack campaign,
aimed to cause a persistent damage to the target. Once the target is com-
promised and the objective is reached, the attacker installs a remote access
toolkit inside the host to guarantee a persistent access. In such situation,
the targeted attacks can be called advanced persistent thread (APT).
2.3 Cyber attack process
At the turn of 21th century, due to the increase of the internet, illegal ac-
tivities involving network and computer were impacting a high number of
users. The increasing connectivity also opened attack paths from across the
world: with the right resources, cyber warfare operations could be under-
taken, threatening the target nation’s security.
While attack taxonomies existed since the Morris Worm, when the CERT
was founded, early works were focused on the classification scheme of secu-
rity flaws, like the Bishop’s taxonomy of UNIX system and network vulner-
abilities [2, 34]. Newer taxonomies faced the problem of which intentions
and objective drive the attacker and how to relate them in a larger attack
campaign. They still however bind too much to the technical details of vul-
nerabilities and security flaws which fail in the classification of a structured
and organized targeted attack.
Over the last few years targeted attacks evolved into specialized and
persistent attacks aimed to steal information, compromise the infrastructure
and leave backdoors to guarantee a persistent access. Moreover, attackers
and targets may have relationships with organization or nations, that could
help understand what is the real objective and how to defend it [34, 44].
These new scenarios, more similar to cyber warfare than cyber attacks,
cannot be handled by the classical taxonomies, thus the security community
produced methods to profile attack processes rather than to classify them
basing on technical properties. Taxonomies moved to a higher level, to be
capable of describing multiple actors, the relation between them and the
attackers’ modus operandi.
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2.3.1 Howard’s Common Language: a first attack process
taxonomy
One notorious taxonomy is the Common Language, published by John
Howard in 1997 [16]. Howard expanded the existing CERT taxonomies by
modelling a primitive attack process. It defines the concept of attacker, who
wants to achieve a set of objectives by means of computer attacks. A group
of attacks sharing the same attacker, objective and timing is called incident.
Objective: purpose or end goal of an incident.
Attacker: an individual who attempts one or more attacks in order to
achieve an objective. Basing on the objective, the attacker can be
classified using various term such as hacker, spy or terrorist.
Attack: a series of steps taken by an attacker to achieve an unauthorized
result.
For the taxonomy to be complete, the attack is divided into steps which
formalize an attack classification. An attack starts with a tool, which exploits
a vulnerability. The exploit allow a series of actions on the target, which
may lead to an unauthorized result. A single action on a target is called
event.
Tool: a means to exploit a vulnerability. As Howard states, this is the most
difficult connection because of the wide variety of methods.
Vulnerability: a weakness in a system allowing unauthorized action.
Action: a step taken by a user or process in order to achieve a result.
Target: a computer or network logical entity or physical entity.
Unauthorized result: a consequence of an event that is not approved by
the owner or administrator.
2.3.2 Cyber warfare taxonomy and military doctrine
In 2001, the Lieutenant Colonel Lionel D. Alford Jr. published an issue,
proposing a military-oriented taxonomy for cyber crime acts. He recognized
the danger of a targeted attack toward modern software-controlled compo-
nents and urged to develop an appropriate defence plan. “Cyber warfare
may be the greatest threat that nations have ever faced. Never before has it
been possible for one person to potentially affect an entire nation’s security.
And, never before could one person cause such widespread harm as is possible
in cyber warfare.“ [23].
Inspired by military taxonomies, Lt. Col. Alford identified the main
stages that occur or may occur during a cyber attack:
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Cyber Infiltration (CyI): during this stage, the attacker identifies all the
system that can be attacked, that is, every system that accepts exter-
nal input. The infiltration can be both physical and remote.
Cyber Manipulation (CyM): following infiltration, an attacker can al-
ter the operation of a system to do damage or to propagate the infec-
tion.
Cyber Assault (CyA): following infiltration, the attacker can destroy soft-
ware and data or disrupt other systems functionality.
Cyber Raid (CyR): following infiltration, the attacker can manipulate or
acquire data and vital information.
A cyber attack can be in the context of cyber warfare (CyW) or cy-
ber crime (CyC), being the attack intent to affect national security or
not. Also, the taxonomy includes some primitive motivation of actors and
their intent. The doctrine distinguish between intentional cyber war-
fare attack (IA) and unintentional cyber warfare attack (UA). The
responsible of the cyber attack are called intentional cyber actors.
Despite the military terms, the taxonomy describes actions that occur
during targeted attacks, being the target a military organization or not.
Moreover, the inclusion of both physical and remote access to the computer
and network infrastructure is a common point with targeted attacks tax-
onomies.
2.3.3 AVOIDIT an extensible taxonomy
AVOIDIT is an acronym for Attack Vector, Operational Impact, Defense,
Information Impact and Target. It’s an often cited taxonomy in the security
community because it first introduces the concept of impact of an attack.
AVOIDIT use five extensible classifications:
Classification by Attack Vector: an attack vector is defined as a path
by which an attacker can gain access to a host. The path is defined as
a vulnerability exploited by the attacker.
Classification by Operational Impact: the operational impact determi-
nates what an attack could do if succeeded. The classification is based
on a custom mutually exclusive list, for instance web resource, a mal-
ware installation or Denial of Service.
Classification by Defence: classification by defence classifies the attack
basing on the defence strategy against the pre- and post- attack. The
defence can involve both a mitigation of the attack damage and a
remediation to the vulnerability.
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Classification by Informational Impact: the informational impact de-
terminates how the targeted sensitive information has been impacted
by the attack.
• Distort - The information is modified.
• Disrupt - The access is changed or denied, for instance as a con-
sequence of a DoS.
• Destruct - The information is deleted.
• Disclosure - The information is accessed from an unauthorized
viewer.
• Discover - Previously unknown information is discovered by the
attacker.
Classification by Attack Target: the target of the attack is any attack-
able entity, such as users, machines or applications.
The AVOIDIT taxonomy allowed to classify complex attacks, by consid-
ering both the various attack vectors and the information impact. It lacks
however of physical attacks classification[40] which is an important aspect
in targeted attacks.
2.3.4 Kill chain for targeted attacks
The kill chain for targeted attacks was never published, but proposed in
a Withe Paper by Lockheed Martin’s company [18]. Authors propose a
military-inspired intrusion kill chain, with respect to computer network at-
tack (CNA) or computer network espionage (CNE). The model describes the
stages the attacker must follow as a chain, thus profiling already performed
attacks or identifying current attacks.
A defence strategy based on kill chain assumes that any deficiency will
interrupt the entire process.
1. Reconnaissance: intelligence and information gathering phase.
2. Weaponization: create the malware and inject it in a weaponized
deliverable.
3. Delivery: transmission of the weapon by means of an attack vector.
4. Exploitation: the malware acts, exploiting the system and compro-
mising the machine.
5. Installation: the malware installs a RAT (remote access tool) or a
Backdoor to allow the attacker an access to the environment.
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6. Command&Control: the malware establishes a connection to the
attacker C&C, getting ready to receive manual commands.
7. Actions on Objectives: the attacker takes actions to achieve his
objective.
2.3.5 Modus Operandi for industrial espionage and targeted
attacks
The paper “Industrial Espionage and Targeted Attacks: Understanding the
Characteristics of an Escalating Threat” in 2012 [44], doesn’t propose a tax-
onomy, but rather a modus operandi for targeted attacks. Authors recognize
the complexity of a targeted attack, and that the targets can be also small
industries and not only large corporations or governments.
The paper identifies a typical modus operandi, based on forensic inves-
tigation of multiple targeted attacks:
Incursion: in this phase the attacker attempts to penetrate a network.
Discovery: once inside, the attacker analyzes the network to spread the
infection and identify the real objective.
Capture: when a worthy computer is infected, the attacker installs an ad-
vanced RAT (remote access toolkit) to improve the stealth capabilities.
Data Exfiltration: the attacker uses the RAT to steal documents, pass-
word and blueprints. The attacker can also use the advanced capabil-
ities to spread deeper into the network.
2.4 Attack process details
This section describes common approach used when performing cyber at-
tacks. It’s important to understand how a cyber attack is performed in order
to design a proper strategy.
2.4.1 Information Gathering
The first stage of every attack is the information gathering, which provides
the intelligence needed by every subsequent phase.
Since recon is the very first phase, the attacker will try not be detected,
because an early detection could warn the target and disrupt the entire
attack. From the defender side, this is also the most difficult phase to
detect, since most of the information can be gathered in legal ways.
A list of critical information needed by the attacker could be[9]:
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Employee’s personally identifiable information: phone numbers, ad-
dresses, biometric records and so forth can be used for the selection of
the right target and attack vector.
Network layouts: web and mails servers, their location, software version
and system fingerprints reveal necessary information for exploitation,
installation and C&C phases.
Company files: reports, databases and source code, for instance, could
reveal software and useful data.
Company information: information such as partners, services, mergers
and acquisitions, facilities plants could delineate social engineering ap-
proach and attack vectors via physical infiltration.
Organizational information: for a successful social engineering attack
and in order to identify the correct target the attacker needs technical
staff and C-team names, organizational charts and corporate structure
details.
Work interaction: emails content templates, inter-communication proto-
cols, security and authentication mechanisms are essential information
for the attack design.
Tons of public information can be obtained by searching in employee’s
social networks profiles, public calendar entries and via specific Google
searches. Private information can be harder to obtain and often requires
the use of social engineering against the company personnel.
2.4.2 Attack vector
Most attacks are performed by creating a malware to be executed inside
the target network. However those malware need to be disguised, to bypass
both security programs and humans by creating a weaponized deliverable.
A typical weaponization it is performed by embedding the malware inside a
valid program, thus creating a trojan, or by exploiting vulnerability of pdf
readers or browser plugins to embed executable code inside documents and
web pages.
Once the weaponized deliverable is ready, it must be sent into the target
machine by means of an attack vector. This phase is the very begin of the
infiltration process, the attacker will use every gathered information to
During delivering, the attacker uses the available intelligence to design
the correct method to reach the objective.
A list of commonly used vector is the following [5]:
14 Cyber Attacks
Email: using a spoofed address and a fake signature, the attacker can play
a member of the C-team or a supplier, attaching the weapon to the
message.
Message: similar to email, but using some chat-based protocols, for in-
stance Skype, used in many organization.
File Sharing: malicious software may be distributed by means of a sharing
system protocol.
Vulnerabilities: internet services, antiviruses, browsers, OSs and other
program that expose themselves to the internet, may have vulnerabili-
ties capable of granting access to an attacker. This vector is dangerous
because it can be completely undetected by the logging systems.
Passwords: although this can be considered a vulnerability itself, a weak
password is a standalone and easy-to-use vector. A weak password
can be broken regardless of any update or security system a sysadmin
could install.
Another possible attack path is the physical interaction. Using social
engineering or disguises, the hacker can try to elude the physical security
systems and deploy manually the malware. A common path is also the
physical deliver of a memory support, such as an USB stick and the use of
social engineering skill to connect it to some host.
2.4.3 Entry point infection and propagation
Once deployed the attacker has an infection to a host that may not be the
target. The infection must be spread into the target network, by using
automated or manual methods.
2.4.4 Action on Objectives
Once the target is infected, the attacker can take the necessary action to
fulfil the objective. Usual actions involve keylogging, data downloading or
attacks toward other targets.
Chapter 3
Methodologies for attack
prevention, detection and
response
ICT security is the result of a competitive evolution between cyber attacks
and systems trying to counter them. Taxonomies and process profiling,
described in the previous chapter, were designed to understand and identify
cyber attacks, in order to create defence systems able to counter them.
As first cyber attacks taxonomies were based on technical vulnerabilities,
first defence approaches were guidelines for developers on how to prevent,
identify and fix security vulnerability in software and networks and also
policy enforcement techniques to prevent unwanted behaviors[7]. However,
defence methods based on these taxonomies failed to be effective against
complex attacks, which cannot be detected nor prevented by patching single
vulnerabilities.
In 1986, the same year of the Morris Worm and of the Howard’s taxon-
omy, Dorothy E. Denning published an intrusion detection model based on
real-time monitoring of the system’s audit record[8], defining the concept of
intrusion detection and prevention system. IDPS are widely used nowadays,
however they are proving ineffective against targeted attacks[15, 12, 27, 44],
and part of the security community is moving toward the concept of as-
sumption of breach[14], which states that a company must be aware that
any IDPS can stop a targeted attack, so it may invest in a fast and reliable
incident response plan.
The following sections describes the common methodologies used as de-
fence against cyber attacks, which are access control models, firewalls, in-
trusion detection and prevention systems, intrusion response systems, vul-
nerability assessment and details on malware analysis.
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3.1 Access Control Models
Access control is the process of protecting system resources against unau-
thorized accesses, by modelling limitations on interaction between subjects
and objects[39]. The act of accessing to a resource may involve the use,
read, modification or physical access to it. A subject is authorized to access
a resource if a policy that permits it exists.
In the field of computer security, access control manages the interac-
tion of users to network and software resources. Generally speaking, users
are mapped to multiple subjects and access control assumes that users are
already identified and authenticated[37].
The security community produced multiple models for access control, but
only three have been widely recognized and used[37], which are Discretionary
Access Control, Mandatory Access Control and Role Based Access Control.
3.1.1 Discretionary Access Control
Discretionary access control (DAC) governs the access of a subject to an
object by using a policy determined by the owner of the object.
DAC is suitable for a variety of systems and application for its flexibility,
however it doesn’t impose any restriction on the usage of objects, that is the
flow of information is not managed[37]. For instance, a user capable of
reading a file may allow other non authorized users to read a copy of the file
without the owner permission.
An example of discretionary access control is the UNIX file modes, where
each file has an owner and a group. The owner sets a subset of permissions
(read, write and execute) for itself, the group and other users.
3.1.2 Mandatory Access Control
Mandatory access control (MAC) governs the access of a subject to an object
by using a policy imposed by the system administrator.
Originally, MAC was tightly coupled to the multi-level security policy[29].
Each object has a security level and a subject a clearance level. Access to
objects must satisfy the following relationships[37]:
Read down: a subject’s clearance must dominate the security level of the
object being read.
Write up: a subject’s clearance must be dominated by the security level of
the object being written.
This approach imposes some degree of control in the information flow.
The write up property imposes that higher-level object cannot be written
into lower-level objects.
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However the original definition of MAC was insufficient to handle com-
plex situation as it ignores critical properties such as intransitivity and dy-
namic separation of duty[29]. These problems led to a more generic defini-
tion of MAC, where the policies are controlled by the system administrator.
3.1.3 Role Based Access Control
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) governs the access of a subject to an
object by means of roles, identified in the system. The RBAC model is
rich and extendible, because “it provides a valuable level of abstraction to
promote security administration at a business enterprise level rather than
at the user identity level”[36]. In order to unify ideas from multiple RBAC
models and commercial products, the NIST published a unified model in
[36], defining RBAC in a four step sequence model. Each step increases the
functional capability of the previous step:
1. Flat RBAC: users are assigned to roles, permissions are assigned to
roles and users acquire permissions by being members of roles.
2. Hierarchical RBAC: introduce role hierarchies, with inheritance (ac-
tivation of a role implies activation of all junior roles) or activation
(no activation assumptions) or both.
3. Constrained RBAC: imposes a separation of concerns, by limiting the
simultaneous activation of certain roles.
4. Symmetric RBAC: include the ability of review a permission-role as-
sociation with respect to a defined user or role.
3.2 Firewalls
A firewall is a network security system, which analyzes the network traffic
enforcing policy based on various protocol headers. Packets that do not
match policy are rejected. The survey on firewall written by Inghan and
Forrest in [19] defines as firewall a machine or a collection of machines be-
tween two networks meeting the following criteria:
• The firewall is at the boundary between the two networks.
• All traffic between the two networks must pass through the firewall.
• The firewall has a mechanism to allow some traffic to pass while block-
ing other traffic (policy enforcing).
Firewalls are able to separate a portion of the network, creating a zone of
trust, for instance by separating the inner network from the outside network.
A trust boundary is needed for security reasons[19]:
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• Masking some security problems in OS, by denying the access to in-
ternal hosts from the outside.
• Preventing access to certain information present in the outside net-
work, for instance by blocking access to certain web sites.
• Preventing information leaks by analyzing the information contained
in the outgoing traffic.
• Logging for audit purposes.
Firewalls can operate as packet filtering or as application layer filtering.
Packet filtering firewalls analyze the traffic from the data-link layer to the
transport layer of the TCP/IP stack, while application layer firewalls enforce
policies at the application layer.
3.2.1 Packet Filters Firewall
Packet filters firewalls use a set of rules to decide whether or not to accept a
packet. Packet filters operate up to the transport layer of the ISO/OSI
stack and make decisions with rules based on a subset of the following
information[19]:
• Source/Destination interface.
• Whether the packet is inbound or outbound.
• Source/destination address.
• Options in the network header.
• Transport-level protocol.
• Flags/options in the transport header.
• Source/destination port or equivalent (if the protocol has such con-
struct).
Packet filters can also perform a better filtering at the transport level, by
keeping the state of the connection. This kind of firewalls is called stateful
filter. For instance, a stateful firewall can keep track of established TCP
connection and some ICMP communication[19], such as the “echo request”.
Packet filters have high performance and doesn’t requires user inter-
actions, however they are incapable of mapping the network traffic to a
user[19]. They can only map the traffic with the host IP, which can lead to
the bad practice of using IP addresses and DNS names for access control.
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3.2.2 Application Layer Firewall
An application layer firewall works like a packet filter firewall, but operates
in the application layer of the ISO/OSI stack. These firewalls are able to
interpret various application protocols, such as FTP, HTTP or DNS.
There are two categories of application layer firewalls:
Network-based firewall: the firewall is a computer system inside the net-
work, which operates as proxy server, or reverse proxy for various ap-
plications/services. A typical example is a web application firewall
(WAF).
Host-based firewall: the firewall operates over the network stack, moni-
toring communication directly made by the application. Unlike network-
based firewalls, a host-based firewall can filter per-process packets, but
it can protect only the host were it is installed.
3.3 Intrusion detection and prevention systems
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring a set of resources, such as
computer systems or networks, and analyzing them to detect intrusions[38].
Intrusion prevention is the ability of stopping ongoing attacks or preventing
them from happening, by modifying the attack context.
Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) are software or hard-
ware system capable of detecting and preventing intrusions, which are at-
tempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability, or to
bypass the security mechanism of a computer or network[38, 28]. IDPS,
often referred as IPS, are a superset of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS),
which offer only the detection capability. The following sections, however,
will focus on IDS and how to classify them.
3.3.1 Intrusion detection model
The intrusion detection model proposed by Denning’s in 1986 is independent
of system, application, vulnerability and intrusion. It defines the objects,
used by subjects under a particular behavior. Any action, expected or un-
expected, is recorded.
Subjects: initiators of activity on a target system.
Objects: resources managed by the system, e.g. files, commands, devices,
etc…
Audit records: generated by the target system in response to actions per-
formed or attempted by subjects on objects. Each audit must have a
timestamp.
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Profiles: structures that characterize the behavior of subject with respect
to objects in terms of statistical metrics and models of observed ac-
tivity. Profiles are automatically generated and initialized from tem-
plates.
Anomaly records: generated when abnormal behavior is detected.
Activity rules: actions taken when some condition is satisfied, which up-
date profiles, detect abnormal behavior, relates anomalies to suspected
intrusion and produce reports.
Although the model is designed for a intrusion detection expert systems[8],
it can used to describe others IDS. However, the security community didn’t
create a standard model or ontology for IDS, resulting in the commercial-
ization of various products with different features and capability. Thus, the
security researchers tried to find a comprehensive taxonomy for the existing
IDS.
3.3.2 Taxonomy for intrusion detection systems
The production of taxonomies for intrusion detection systems had a burst
in the 2000s. Many papers propose classifications based on methodology
and technology, and other papers were published as surveys and reviews of
existing taxonomies. In an attempt to organize issues and classes, Hung-Jen
Liao, Chun-Hung Richard Lin, Ying-Chih Lin and Kuang-Yuan Tung pub-
lished a comprehensive review of IDS in 2012[28]. The following taxonomy
is the result of their work.
Intrusion detection systems has four characteristic, each of them has
multiple viewpoints. An IDS classification is performed by identifying every
viewpoint of each characteristic.
• System Deployment: defines on which technology the IDS is de-
signed to work. Thus, it determinates which objects can be monitored,
• Data source: defines which kinds of data are used and how they are
gathered. Data is the base of audit records.
• Timeliness: define the IDS detection granularity and how it reacts.
It’s a particular aspect of activity rules.
• Detection Strategy: defines methodologies and strategies for de-
tection and processing. It defines profiles, activity rules and how to
generate anomaly records.
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System Deployment
System deployment concerns with what the system is supposed to moni-
tor and how it’s interconnected with the infrastructure. The deployment
consists of three different viewpoints: technology type, networking type and
network architecture.
The technology type determinate what events the IDS can collect and
inspect. There are four classes of technology type[28]:
• Host-based IDS (HIDS): monitors and collects information from
hosts and servers using agents.
• Network-based IDS (NIDS): captures network traffic of specific
network segments through sensors and analyzes protocols and com-
munication of applications.
• Wireless-based IDS (WIDS): similar to a NIDS, but sensors cap-
ture traffic from wireless domain.
• Network Behavior Analysis (NBA): works like an NIDS, but in-
spect the traffic to identify attacks with unexpected traffic flows.
• Mixed IDS (MIDS): is an IDS with multiple technologies.
With network architecture, an IDS is classified basing on how it detects
attacks[28]:
• Centralized: the IDS detects attack basing on data from a single
monitored system.
• Distributed: the IDS is capable of detect structured attacks that
involve multiple systems. The distributed approach can be parallelized,
grid-based or cloud-based.
• Hybrid: the IDS uses multiple approaches.
Finally, the networking type identifies how the IDS is interconnected with
the system[28], which can be wired, wireless or mixed.
Data Source
Data source determinates how the IDS gather data and which data it can
handle. An IDS collect data by means of collection components, which can
be software based (agents) or hardware based (sensors).
Data from components can be collected in a centralized or distributed
fashion, depending on the IDS has a single server which gathers all data or
it has intermediate gatherers.
The last viewpoint is the data type, strongly related to the technology
type:
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• Host logs: related to the host activities, they include system com-
mands, system accounting, system logs and security logs.
• Application logs: logs from a single application.
• Wireless network traffic: includes all the traffic gathered in the
wireless domain.
• Network traffic: in addition to network packets, it includes also
SNMP information.
Timeliness
Timeliness determinates how the IDS behaves in the time dimension:
• Time of Detection: can be “real time/on-line” or “non-real time/off-
line”.
• Time granularity: describes when the IDS process the data for sign
of attacks. It can be continuous, periodic or batch.
• Detection-response: determinates if the IDS is also an IDPS. It
can be passive, that is the IDS take no countermeasures against the
detected attack or active if the IDS tries to prevent the attack.
Detection Strategy
Once the data is gathered, the detection strategies determinate how the in-
formation is produced. The detection discipline viewpoint establishes how
the state of insecureness is handled; if an IDS recognize two states (secure
and insecure), the IDS is called state based, while if it recognize the tran-
sition from secure to insecure, and vice versa, the IDS is called transition
based. Both state and transition based IDS can evaluate the state using an
non-obstructive or stimulating evaluation, depending on the IDS infers the
system status by the passive monitoring of the systems or if it obtains other
data by interacting with the system.
The processing strategy viewpoint, as for the data collection viewpoint
of data source, can be centralized or distributed.
Finally, the detection methodology is one of the most important aspect,
because it determinates how the IDS recognize a threat [28]. There are three
possible methodologies:
• Signature-based: the IDS search the logs for known strings or pat-
tern associated with a threat. It is also known as Knowledge-based
detection or misuse detection.
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• Anomaly-based: the IDS detects anomalies, which are deviations
from a known behavior (profile). A profile can be either static or
dynamic. It is also known as behavior-based detection.
• Specification-based: the IDS understands various protocols and
keep track of their state, searching from anomalous behaviors. It’s
called stateful protocol analysis and differs from anomaly-based detec-
tion, because the protocol profiles are generic and low-level.
3.3.3 IDS comparison
Intrusion detection systems are often specialized in particular field and tech-
nologies, thus comparison between them results in a pro-cons list. However,
knowing the strength and limitation of different IDS is necessary to build a
complete defence system. The major comparison are done basing on tech-
nology type (see table 3.2) and detection methodologies (see table 3.1)[28].
Signature-based
Pros
• Simple and effective against known attacks.
• Detail contextual analysis.
Cons
• Ineffective against unknown attacks or variants of known attacks.
• Little understanding of states and protocols.
• Need to keep signatures and patterns up to date.
Anomaly-based
Pros
• Effective against new and unforeseen vulnerabilities.
• Less dependent on OS.
• Facilitate detection of privilege abuse.
Cons
• Weak profiles accuracy due to observed events being constantly changed.
• Difficult to trigger alerts in right time.
Specification-based
Pros
• know and trace the protocol states.
• Distinguish unexpected sequence of commands.
Cons
• Resource consuming due to protocol state tracing and examination.
• Unable to detect attacks conforming to the protocol.
• Too much dependent on OSs or APs.
Table 3.1: Pros and cons of intrusion detection methodologies[28]
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HIDS
Pros • Can analyze end-to-end encrypted communication.
Cons
• Lack of context knowledge results in difficult detection accuracy.
• Delays in alert generation and centralized reporting.
• Consume host resources.
• May conflict with existing security controls.
NIDS
Pros • Can analyze the broadest scopes of AP protocols.
Cons
• Cannot monitor wireless protocol.
• High false positive and false negative rates.
• Cannot passively detect attacks within encrypted traffic.
• Difficult analysis under high loads.
WIDS
Pros
• Narrow focus allows a more accurate detection.
• Only technology able to supervise wireless protocol activities.
Cons
• Cannot monitor application, transmission and network level protocol activi-
ties.
• Physical jamming attacks against sensors are possible.
NBA
Pros
• Able to detect reconnaissance scanning.
• Can reconstruct malware infections.
• Can reconstruct DoS attacks.
Cons • The transferring flow data to NBA in batches causes a delay in attacks detec-
tion.
Table 3.2: Pros and cons of IDS technology types[28]
3.3.4 Intrusion prevention capabilities
The previous taxonomies was focused on intrusion detection, because in-
trusion prevention is strongly related to the detection and may be seen as
additional capabilities, rather than a factor for further classification[28, 38].
The NIST guide to intrusion detection and prevention systems[38], de-
scribe the prevention capabilities for each IDS technology type class.
Network-based IDPS and network behavior analysis IDPS op-
erates in similar ways, by altering the network communication. Such IDPSs
can:
• End the current TCP session (session sniping).
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• Perform inline firewalling by dropping or rejecting suspicious network
activity.
• Throttle bandwidth usage, in case of DoS attacks, file sharing or mal-
ware distribution.
• Alter malicious content, by active sanitization of the payload.
• Reconfigure other network security devices, such as firewalls, routers
and switches to block certain activities or route them toward a decoy
or also to quarantine an infected system.
• Trigger a response plan (see section 3.4).
A wireless-based IDPS operated directly by terminating the malicious
wireless session and preventing a new connection to be established, or, if a
wired link is present, The WIDPS can instruct router and switches connected
to the access point to block the suspicious network activity.
A host-based IDPS agent operates directly on the host, thus it can
perform multiple prevention actions:
• Prevent malicious code to be executed.
• Prevent some application to invoke certain processes, for instance to
prevent network application to execute shells.
• Prevent network traffic to be processed by the host.
• Prevent suspicious outgoing traffic to be sent to the network.
• Reconfigure the local firewall.
• Dynamic policy enforcement.
• Prevent access, read or usage to some files, which could stop malware
installation.
3.4 Intrusion Response Systems
Intrusion detection systems are in continuous development, and new tech-
niques for detection and prevention are always refined. However, in case
of attack detection, an IDS doesn’t offers a full support for an automated
counter-measure to the attack[43].
From an high-level prospective, the process of intrusion response involve
the following actions[13, 30]:
• Contain the effect of an attack, in case of a multi-staged attack or an
APT.
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• Recover affected services.
• Take longer term actions, such as reconfiguration or patching, to pre-
vent further attacks.
• Gather and handle evidences for law enforcement.
• Minimize the effect of information leaks.
The process of response to an ongoing or concluded attack is a high
heterogeneous, system dependent problem and received less attention from
the security community[43, 13, 14]. However, the increasing complexity of
systems and attacks, made the manual intrusion response inadequate and
the cost necessary to maintain an effective team for incident response raised.
An intrusion response system (IRS) is a system capable of automatize
and ease the incident response steps. In 2007, Stakhanova proposed a tax-
onomy for IRS[43] to provide a foundation for further works on intrusion
response.
3.4.1 Taxonomy for Intrusion Response System
Intrusion response systems can be classified according to the activity of
triggered response and to the degree of automation[43].
Activity of Triggered Response
The activity of triggered response determinates how an IRS responds when
a new attack is detected. The response can be passive or active, according to
the IRS notifies the system administrator and provides attack information or
if the IRS attempts to contain the damage or to locate or harm the attacker.
Common passive responses are:
• Notify the administrator by generating an alarm.
• Generate a comprehensive report of the attack.
• Enable additional IDS or logging activity.
• Enable forensic and information gathering tools.
An active response can operates on hosts or network. Host-based response
actions can be:
• Deny access to files.
• Allow to operate on fake files.
• Restore or delete infected files.
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• Restrict user activity or disable the user account.
• Shutdown or disable compromised services or host.
• Terminate suspicious process.
• Abort or delay suspicious system calls.
While network-based response actions can be:
• Enable or disable additional firewall rules.
• Block suspicious incoming/outgoing network connection.
• Block ports or IP addresses
• Trace connection to perform attacker isolation or quarantine
• Create a remote decoy or honeypot.
Degree of automation
Basing on the degree of automation an IRS can be categorized as:
Notification system: provides information about the intrusion. The sys-
tem administrator has the duty of perform and intrusion response
basing on the notification information.
Manual response system: provides a higher level of automation, by pre-
senting the attack log and a set of pre-determined responses to be
launched by the administrator.
Automatic response system: opposed to the manual response system,
the automatic response system provides immediate response through
an automated decision-making process.
Automatic response support is very limited, but many IRS offers high
level of automation. Thus the automatic response systems can be further
classified by the ability to adjust, the time instance of the response, the
cooperation ability and by the response selection mechanism.
The ability to adjust determinates if an IRS is capable of dynamically
adapting the response selection to the changing environment during the
attack time. A static approach it’s simple and easy to maintain but requires
periodical upgrades and the true effectiveness of the response plan is truly
tested only during an attack. On the other hand, an adaptive approach
can operates in many ways, for instance by adjusting the system resource
devoted to intrusion response or by reasoning on previous success or failure
responses.
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The time instance of the response classifies an IRS basing on when the
response plan is activated basing on the attack time. A proactive approach
tries to foresee the incoming intrusion before the attack has effected the
resource. A delayed approach applies the response plan once the attack has
been confirmed. Although a proactive system can execute more effective
response actions, its design is complex and a high false rate of the attack
foreseen can trigger inappropriate responses.
The cooperation capability relates a set of IRS by their intercommunica-
tion. A cooperative IRS, in contrast with an autonomous IRS, can cooperate
with other systems to provide a global detection and response.
The last characteristic is the response selection mechanism, which deter-
minates how the IRS selects the response plan basing on the alarm and the
environment conditions. A static mapping may be seen as an automated
manual response system: the system administrator maps a response plan
to certain alarms and the IRS automates the response actions. However
this approach seems to be infeasible for large systems with vast and com-
plex threat scenarios. A dynamic mapping, instead, takes into account also
custom metrics, such as confidence or severity of attack. The response plan
is then formulated at real-time basing on both alarms and environment.
Finally, a more business oriented approach is the cost-sensitive mapping,
which determinates the optimal response basing on the balance between the
intrusion damage and response cost.
3.5 Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability are the gateways by which threads are manifested[4], in other
words, vulnerability are attack paths for both opportunistic and targeted
attackers. The vulnerability assessment is the process of identifying, quan-
tifying and prioritizing the vulnerabilities in a system.
Vulnerability assessment should be performed for external and internal
network reachable systems and singular hosts, in order to protect against
remote attack and malware spreading and infection. Possible vulnerabilities
that can be encountered can be:
• Application misconfiguration - for instance by allowing unauthen-
ticated users to perform write actions or by permitting the execution
of external applications.
• Unpatched system - system vulnerabilities are published by means
of bugs and CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) entries.
Once a vulnerability has been exposed the system is to consider vul-
nerable until a new patch is released and applied.
• Default configuration - many applications come with a default con-
figuration, such as passwords, opened ports or seeds, which can be
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easily exploited.
The action of securing the company systems doesn’t scale well with its
size and complexity, thus the vulnerability assessment should be expanded in
an organized vulnerability management process able to control information
security risk[33]. An example of vulnerability management process is[33]:
1. Preparation: the process starts by organizing vulnerability scans into
meaningful and limited chunk of systems. The preparation should also
determinate which kind of scan to employ (i.e. external, internal or
host-based).
2. Initial vulnerability scan: during this phase, the scans defined in
the preparation phase are executed. The result is a list of vulnerabili-
ties.
3. Remediation phase: after the vulnerabilities are obtained, each one
of them must be quantified and prioritized for remediation. The fea-
sibility, the risk and the amount of work required depends on the
type and rank of the vulnerability, the kind of the affected system/ap-
plication and by which corrective measure is required (e.g. patch or
reconfiguration?). The result of this phase is a work plan.
4. Implement remediating actions: the remediation work plan is
applied. If a corrective action fails, alternatives must be discussed.
5. Rescan: a second scan is performed to test the mitigation plan. If
a mitigation action wasn’t successful, new corrective actions must be
discussed and applied.
3.6 Malware analysis
Executables and active documents can exhibit malicious behaviors, threat-
ening the safety of the system (see section 2.1). Defence systems try to
detect malware by performing an automatic analysis.
The first approach is the static analysis, which analyzes the malware
without executing it. From static analysis, information such as strings, call
graphs, parameters value and known signature can be extracted[10], how-
ever this approach can be drastically complicated by packing, self-modifying
code, ciphers and code disallignment.
Therefore, the security community is continuously developing advanced
methods to analyze malware actions while executing the malware itself[10].
This approach is called dynamic analysis.
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3.6.1 Dynamic analysis information
The dynamic analysis detects malicious software by observing the malware
behavior and detecting malicious actions. Malicious actions are identified
on how the malware interact with the environment, thus many activities can
be observed:
Filesystem access - Malware usually drop other stages or modified ver-
sion of them, by writing executable on the disk. They can also access
configuration files or documents for discovering vulnerabilities or steal-
ing data.
Network activity analysis - The majority of malware communicates with
remote C&C or tries to scan the network to spread the infection. By
analyzing the network communication, the analyst can obtain infor-
mation on remote location, protocol and spreading methods.
Process interactions - A malware can interact with other process to hide
its execution, self delete the executable or exploit a running process.
Inter-process synchronization - Inter-process synchronization requires
the creation of files or named mutex. Although not a malicious action
by itself, it can provide additional information.
Registry/System configuration access - The system configuration can
be read or written for various reasons. Example of suspicious behavior
can be to search information about installed programs, such as the
antivirus, or insert the executable inside the autostart list.
3.6.2 Dynamic analysis techniques
Information about malware behaviors can be obtained using multiple ap-
proaches. This section describes techniques on how to gather such informa-
tion.
System Calls Monitoring
In order to act on the system, a malware needs to access the system calls
of the OS. Windows, for instance, offers a set of API (e.g. functions in
kernel32.dll), a set of native API and system calls, which are direct invo-
cation of the kernel. The native API is a bridge between the API and the
system calls.
By analyzing the sequence of API calls and their parameters, the analysis
system can track the malware behavior. The call monitoring is performed
by means of function call hooks[10], which can be implemented using:
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• Binary rewriting: binary rewriting consists in rewriting the first
byte of every called code with a jmp to a hook function. The hook
function must re-implements the overwritten instructions and returns
to the original code[17].
• Debugging: a program can debug the malware inserting breakpoints
at every call.
• Dynamic linked libraries replacing: the DLL used by the malware
can be replaced with custom DLL simulating the expected behavior.
Information Flow Tracking
The tracking on the information flow is an orthogonal approach to the moni-
toring of the system calls[10]. The idea is to mark (taint) a memory location
with a label and follow its usage and relationships during the execution.
The information flow tracking uses the following concepts[10]:
• Taint source: introduces new labels into the system.
• Taint sink: react to tainted inputs.
• Direct data dependency: dependency created after a direct assign-
ment or arithmetic operations (see figure 3.1).
• Address dependency: created when a tainted value is used as ad-
dress for memory read or write operations (see figure 3.2).
• Control flow dependency: conditional assignments of a variable
based on tainted values, causes a control flow dependency to be created
(see figure 3.3).
Pure dynamic information flow tracking can be easily evaded by using a
semantic dependency[10] (see figure 3.4). The value of x influences the value
of v with an implicit dependency, which can be discovered only by analyzing
the unexplored branch. This can be done with branch static analysis, or
using multipath techniques[10].
1 // x is tainted
2 a = x;
3 b = x * 3;
4
5 // Know both a and b are tainted and dependent with x
6
Figure 3.1: Direct data dependency
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1 // x and y are tainted
2
3 a = x[0];
4 // Know a is tainted and dependent with x
5
6 b = v[y];
7 // Know b is tainted and dependent with y
8
Figure 3.2: Address dependency
1 // x is tainted
2 if (x == 0)
3 a = 1;
4 else
5 a = 0;
6
7 // Now a is tainted and dependent with x
8
Figure 3.3: Control flow dependency
1 // x is tainted
2 a = 0; b = 0;
3 if (x == 1) a = 1; else b = 1;
4 if (a == 0) v = 0;
5 if (b == 0) v = 1;
6
7 // If x is 1, a is tainted and dependent with x but v not
8 // If x is 0, b is tainted and dependent with x but v not
9
Figure 3.4: Tainting evasion
Multipath analysis
Multipath analysis is an extension of information flow tracking, proposed
by Moser in 2007[31]. It permits to analyze multiple execution paths by
recording dependency and constraints between memory locations and forcing
a new consistent state at each branch.
Usually the tainting sources are values obtained from the environment,
such as network communication, date or files. When registering a depen-
dency between a tainted value and a new memory location, the system also
registers the constraints between the values. When the program reaches a
3.6 Malware analysis 33
conditional jump based on a tainted value, the system tries to force each
branch. The consistency of the variables is obtained by solving the con-
straint problem. This approach is expensive; in fact Moser system allows
only linear constraints.
Multipath analysis allows bypassing logic bombs triggers, by forcing the
conditions and running the malicious code.
3.6.3 Dynamic analysis implementation
Malware analysis techniques can be implemented in various environments[10]:
Analysis in User-space/Kernel-space - The malware is analyzed in user
space or kernel space, gathering information such as invoked functions,
API calls and memory values. However, it’s difficult to analyze the
information flow and an advanced malware could be able to detect or
evade the analysis program.
Memory and CPU emulation - The malware is launched into a sand-
box, preventing any side-effects on the system. Each instruction is
analyzed and performed into a virtual environment; therefore the anal-
ysis system must simulate all the mechanisms offered by the operating
system. A missing or bad emulated component can be exploited from
the malware to evade the sandbox.
Full system emulation - The analysis system emulates a complete envi-
ronment with CPU, memory, peripherals, network interfaces and an
operating system. This approach permits the emulation of different ar-
chitecture as well, for instance ARM. The analyst has a physical level
access to the system and the malware must find flaw into the CPU
emulation (commonly referred as red pills) to detect the emulation.
Virtual Machine - A virtual machine differs from an emulated system
because the host and the guest architecture are identical and the VM
allows the guest system to execute non privileged instructions. This
feature results in a performance improvement.
Another important aspect is the network simulation[10]. The analysis
system could simulate a network with basic services (DNS, mail, IRC, FTP,
etc…) and redirect every request to them. This method is safer, but it cannot
deal with custom protocols nor can simulate valid message such as the C&C
commands exchange. Another solution is to allow a filtered access to the
internet, by limiting the network traffic and spreading. This approach allows
the malware to receive commands from the C&C or to enable additional
hidden behaviors, by triggering the download of other malware components.
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Chapter 4
Defence strategies against
targeted attacks
In chapter 3 I mentioned that intrusion detection and prevention systems
are proving to be ineffective against targeted attacks and that companies
are investing in intrusion response plans. Intrusion Response Systems offers
an improved level of protection that may be suitable for targeted attacks,
in particular to advanced persistent threat, because they made the legit
assumption that an attack needs time to be performed and thwarting it
during the early stages could contain the damage. However, also automatic
intrusion response systems rely on attack detection, otherwise the response
plan will never start.
Many recent papers claim that targeted attacks are hard to detect using
conventional defence systems[15, 12, 27, 44, 14]. In some cases, the breach
occurred long before its discovery and the investigation involved a difficult
forensic process.
But are targeted attacks really capable of bypass detection? To answer
this question, Ramilli Marco, Mella Luca and I performed a targeted attack
against ACME Corporation to prove the ineffectiveness of conventional defence
systems.
In section 4.1 I describe the targeted attack we performed. In section 4.2,
I analyze the results of the attack, in particular why the defence systems
failed to detect it. Finally, in section 4.3 and 4.4 I describe the developed
defence approach against targeted attacks, while in section ?? I list some
tools to be used as support.
4.1 A real targeted attack
The targeted attack was aimed to bypass the security systems and infect the
executives’ personal computers with a malware. Once inside, each malware
had to scan the pc for project files and log the keys pressed. Table 4.1
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describes the attack process using the kill chain model and table 4.1 classifies
the attack according to the AVOIDIT taxonomy.
The attack started with an information gathering phase. The objective
was to learn:
• Which antivirus is installed or is likely to be installed in the hosts.
• If and which intrusion detection system guards the perimeter.
• External website vulnerabilities.
• Involved person, clients.
• Email addresses and communication format.
• Physical defence.
• Policy for physical access.
By using scrapers, web scans and some social engineering, we discovered
a few information about the network and the IDS, but we failed to gather
information about the antivirus. Then, basing on the available information,
we designed a malware composed by four stages:
1. The first stage is a dropper, which serves as a social engineering entry
point, by fooling the user to execute it. Once started, the first stage
works drops the second stage and execute it.
2. The second stage implements stealth and evasion techniques, to hide
itself from users and defence system. The main evasion is realized
with a Logic Bomb: the second stage has an encrypted third stage,
which is decrypted when the trigger is asynchronously activated by
the attacker. Once the third stage is decrypted, it’s executed.
3. The third stage is designed to be injected into other processes, as part
of exploits or remote execution, however our malware didn’t perform
any exploitation and directly execute the third stage. The third stage
contacts the C&C and downloads the final stage.
4. The fourth stage installs a backdoor on the host, allowing the attacker
to execute commands, keylogging and to download or upload files.
Our malware is exposed against the antivirus only for the first stage and
second stage, because they are saved the disk, while other stages resides only
in memory. The malware was new and unknown, so no signature existed
and the only possible detection would be by suspicious behavior. Thus, we
designed and tested the second stage so that it won’t rise any alarm with the
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majority of antivirus systems both when it waits for the trigger and when
the fourth stage is downloaded.
To further bypass the analysis of both fourth stage and communications,
we used an HTTPS connection with the C&C. Unless the system performed
TSL inspection, and according to the information gathering phase it didn’t,
any encrypted communication couldn’t be analyzed.
Reconnaissance Web scan, physical presence, social engi-
neering interactions via mails and in per-
son.
Weaponization Executable archive with real files and mal-
ware.
Delivery Physical deliver or drive-by-download of
the malware. Trigger activated via email.
Exploitation None.
Installation User-space RAT installation.
Command&Control Immediate connection to the remote C&C
using HTTPS.
Actions on Objectives File downloads, file upload, keylogging.
Table 4.1: Attack description using the KillChain model (section 2.3.4)
Attack Vector Social Engineering
Operational Impact Installed Malware, Trojan
Defence - Mitigation Remove from network
Defence - Remediation Computer security awareness course for
personnel
Informational Impact Disclosure
Target User
Table 4.2: Attack classification using the AVOIDIT taxonomy (section 2.3.3)
4.2 Why did defence systems fail?
When we performed the first tests and then the attack, we were rather
surprised. The malware bypassed advanced defence systems, without the
use of any exploitation.
The answer to why did defence systems fail? is complex and involve
several aspect, so I broke the question down into the following subquestion,
one for each attack stage:
• Why wasn’t the recon phase detected? Web scans may results
as burst of accesses to the website. It’s difficult to discriminate nor-
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mal traffic from reconnaissance. Moreover the scraping on external
websites cannot be detected.
• Why wasn’t the malware detected? The NIDS checked the down-
loaded executable using automatic behavioral analysis and signatures
detection, same for the antivirus on the host. The malware didn’t
have known signatures, and it was designed to be multi-staged: the
malicious actions won’t begin until a condition is triggered by the
attacker.
• Why was the malware executed? Using advanced social engineer-
ing, untrained personnel can be lured in executing the malware.
• Why weren’t the C&C communication detected? The malware
used an HTTPS connection toward a website with unknown reputa-
tion. No SSL proxy was used, thus encrypted communication cannot
be examined. However, basing on further tests, even if TSL inspec-
tion were present, a custom http-based protocol would have evaded
the signature analysis on payload and communication.
Although the questions covered different aspect of the attack, three ma-
jor causes can be identified:
• Signature detection: detection by signature can be very efficient
and effective against opportunistic attacks, but targeted attacks use
custom and unknown malware, for which there is no signature.
• Failed to inspect TSL/SSL connection: targeted attacks have
to manage few connections, so they can develop and use less efficient
protocols which are harder to detect. Modern IDS can inspect SSL
connection, but it’s not enabled by default because it introduces net-
work delay and problems with certificate recognition.
• High level of social engineering: emails and communication are
studied to be realistic, it’s easy to perceive them as real.
After performing the attack, I analyzed common attack process and de-
fence systems to answer the question: can targeted attack be prevented or
detected?
Prevention against targeted attack is hard to employ. Our attack, for
instance, didn’t perform any exploitation and passed undetected through
many active defence systems. If real time detection fails, the prevention
cannot act. Moreover, our malware compensated the absence of system ex-
ploitation with “human exploitation”. Although a refresher course for em-
ployees about computer security and social engineer, may have compromise
the attack, other entry points, such as via BYOD1, are harder to control.
1Bring your own device
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Since prevention requires detection, my work focused on how to detect
a targeted attack, or at least on how to increase the change of detection. A
design of an automatic real-time protection requires a different data set and
a different work and, more important, it couldn’t be immediately deployed
inside ACME Corporation. Thus I have identified some key aspect that can
be used by an analyst to pinpoint possible targeted attacks.
Since the strategy had to be deployed inside a enterprise context, I had
to consider many problems:
• Legacy systems: some systems cannot be upgraded, nor host defence
systems can be installed on them.
• Number of executables and pdf docs: executables and pdf docu-
ments may be malicious, however big enterprises downloads hundreds
of them every day. Manual analysis of each file is unfeasible.
• Presence of external devices: many devices and even servers can
reside inside the private network but not be under the direct control of
the enterprise. The rest of the network must be protected from them
and vice versa.
• Network and host resources: defence systems may not use exces-
sive bandwidth or host resources.
• Defence against opportunistic attacks: targeted attacks may be
an higher threat, but they are in lower number than opportunistic
attacks, which still remain a constant menace.
• Prevention, detection and response cost: a security problem can
be seen as a ticket. It must be opened, described and quantified with
a risk evaluation value, so that the administration team can prioritize
the cleanup operations.
After identifying some content, the approach evolved into a conceptual
framework for targeted attack detection in synergy with a business pro-
cess: targeted attacks are too complex and context-dependent, thus also
the defence should be complex and context-dependent. My approach is not
another defence system, but rather a service.
In the following sections I will refer as organization the teams resposible
of the targeted attacks detection and as company the monitored client.
4.3 WASTE: Warning Automatic System for Tar-
geted Events
WASTE is a framework which is capable of rising warnings by analyzing events
generated by existing defence systems. The core idea of WASTE is that defence
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systems are capable of recording and analyzing events related to targeted
attacks, however they fail to automatically mark them as malicious. How-
ever, if such events could be marked as suspicious, meaning that an expert
judgment is required, the framework generates a warning for an analyst
team (composed by human beings) that analyzes the events to infer what
an automatic system cannot do. As a consequence, WASTE itself cannot be
an install-and-forget system. It requires constant monitoring and improve-
ment, to create, improve or delete detection methods, which are extremely
dependent from the deployment context.
The design of WASTE changes from company to company. Requirements,
scenarios and policies are hard to predict and generalize and I leak of the
required experience. Thus, I propose WASTE as a conceptual framework, by
modeling the core ideas only.
Figure 4.1 describe the core use cases of WASTE. The framework has three
main actors:
• Analyst Team: responsible for the analysis of warnings and the
proposal of new detection methods.
• Detection Team: fix the issue of WASTE and manage the detection
methods.
• Defence System: already existing automatic defence system to be
inquired.
Use cases describe what is expected from the system:
1. Propose detection method: the analyst team can propose detec-
tion methods basing on their experience and the detection team will
receive the proposal.
2. Notify Warnings: The analyst team is interested in receiving the
warnings generated by the system.
3. Recover related events: Given a warning, the analyst team must
recover which events are correlated.
4. Examine defence system: the defence system is examined to detect
new warnings.
5. Mantain WASTE: check the system functionality and fix issues.
6. Manage WASTE: the detection team manage the detection methods
inside WASTE, by improving, creating, removing or disabling detec-
tion methods.
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Figure 4.1: WASTE use cases
From the use cases I propose a core domain model, to better formalize the
requirements. Figure 4.2 shows the core system entities, figure 4.3 shows the
interaction of the detector, figure 4.4 the interaction of the detection team
with the system to fulfil the use case Manage WASTE, figure 4.5 shows
the interaction between the two teams to propose new detection methods.
Finally, figure 4.6 shows the behavior of the detector.
The core aspects of WASTE are the detectors. To write good detectors
permits to obtain meaningful warnings, thus rising the possibility of detect-
ing a targeted attack. Approaches for detectors can be inspired to the cyber
attacks models described in chapter 2 or defence approaches taxonomies of
chapter 3.
I used some concepts of the kill chain model (section 2.3.4) and the
modus operandi (section 2.3.5), basing on our attacks and those described
in other papers and white papers[18, 27, 44, 11], to identify some key aspects
for detecting targeted attacks.
In particular I have considered email-driven attacks (section 4.3.1), exe-
cutable and document analysis (section 4.3.2) and network communications
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Figure 4.2: WASTE domain model: structure
Figure 4.3: WASTE domain model: detector interaction. Fulfil use cases 2, 3
and 4
(section 4.3.3).
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Figure 4.4: WASTE domain model: WASTE interaction. Fulfil use case 6
Figure 4.5: WASTE domain model: proposal interaction. Fulfil use case 1
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Figure 4.6: WASTE domain model: detector behavior
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4.3.1 Email-driven attacks detection
According to the Verizon data breach report[11], emails attack vector for
malware spreading was used in more than fifty percent of the attacks. Also
our attack and those described in [18] and [27] used email as vector.
An email attack can occur in three different ways:
1. Spoofing - Spoofing is a social engineering technique, the attacker
spoof the sender address with a valid email address. He cannot receive
any response, but he has a better chance to fool the receiver.
2. Similar Domain - Another social engineering technique. The at-
tacker uses a domain that is similar to an allowed name, for instance
by sending a mail from @acrne.com, instead of @acme.com [9]. The do-
main can be either spoofed or registered. The latter case permits the
attacker to receive responses.
3. External Domain - An attacker could just use a valid external do-
main, such as gmail.com or yahoo.com, as it happens in [18]. The social
engineering attack resides in the message content.
Spoofed and emails with similar domain can have a great impact if unde-
tected. Figure 4.7 shows an email header sent from Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it
to target@gmail.com, while figure 4.8 shows a similar email with same sender
and destination but it wasn’t sent from @acme.it, but using a postfix mail
server.
GMail identified the spoofed email as real, because the spam filters didn’t
match any signatures and the source IP is not blacklisted. However, my
approaches assume the presence of an analyst team, which is alerted when
suspicious activities occurs and can act according.
Real mail and fake mail, besides some missing or additional headers, can
be distinguished by the Received: from header. The real email has (real IPs
have been masked):
Received: from mail.acme.it ([192.168.66.55])
The spoofed email is very likely to have a different IP address:
Received: from mail.acme.it ([192.168.100.100])
When receiving an email, the analyst team can perform three automatic
checks before beginning the manual analysis:
• Reverse DNS query - the displayed hostname usually differs from
the domain name bound to the IP address. However if the email isn’t
spoofed, it’s very likely that the hostname and the IP domain name re-
sides in the same domain, for instance mail.acme.it and someserver.acme.it.
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1 Delivered -To: target@gmail.com
2 Received: by 10.68.237.229 with SMTP id xxxxxxxxxxxxx;
3 Sat, 8 Mar 2014 06:15:38 -0800 (PST)
4 X-Received: by 10.14.206.137 with SMTP id
5 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xx.xxxxxxxxxxxxx;
6 Sat, 08 Mar 2014 06:15:37 -0800 (PST)
7 Return-Path: <Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it>
8 Received: from mail.acme.it ([192.168.66.55])
9 by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id
10 xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxx.2014.03.08.06.15.36
11 for <target@gmail.com>
12 (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
13 bits=128/128);
14 Sat, 08 Mar 2014 06:15:37 -0800 (PST)
15 Received-SPF: neutral (google.com: 192.168.66.55 is
16 neither permitted nor denied by best guess
17 record for domain of Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it)
18 client-ip=192.168.66.55;
19 Authentication -Results: mx.google.com;
20 spf=neutral (google.com: 192.168.66.55 is
21 neither permitted nor denied by best guess
22 record for domain of Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it)
23 smtp.mail=Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it
24 Received: from SERVER.acme.local
25 ([1:2:3:4:5:6]) by
26 acme-Server.acme.local
27 ([1:2:3:4:5:6%7]) with mapi id
28 xx.xx.xx.xx; Sat, 8 Mar 2014 15:15:34 +0100
29 From: Daniele Bellavista <Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it>
30 To: "target@gmail.com" <target@gmail.com>
31 Subject: This is the real message
Figure 4.7: Real email header
• Hostname distance check - if the email address has an hostname
similar to a known one, it could be a social engineering approach. Host-
name distance check can be implemented using Approximate String
Matching, against a database of known hosts.
• IP reputation - IP addresses associated with mail servers are likely
to have a good reputation, that is many DNSBLs (DNS blackhole lists)
repute it has good. On the other hand, a normal IP address is likely
to have a neutral or bad reputation. IP reputatio can be used both in
Spoofing and Similar Domain cases.
Figure 4.9 shows a proof of concept, written in python of the email
checks. Output example are shown in figure 4.10.
The Spoofing and Similar Domain cases can be pinpointed easily if those
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1 Delivered -To: target@gmail.com
2 Received: by 10.68.237.229 with SMTP id xxxxxxxxxxxxx;
3 Sat, 8 Mar 2014 06:50:25 -0800 (PST)
4 X-Received: by 10.14.180.2 with SMTP id
5 xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xx.xxxxxxxxxxxxx;
6 Sat, 08 Mar 2014 06:50:24 -0800 (PST)
7 Return-Path: <Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it>
8 Received: from mail.acme.it ([192.168.100.100])
9 by mx.google.com with ESMTP id
10 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxx.2014.03.08.06.50.23
11 for <target@gmail.com>;
12 Sat, 08 Mar 2014 06:50:24 -0800 (PST)
13 Received-SPF: neutral (google.com: 192.168.100.100 is
14 neither permitted nor denied by best guess
15 record for domain of Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it)
16 client-ip=192.168.100.100;
17 Authentication -Results: mx.google.com;
18 spf=neutral (google.com: 192.168.100.100 is
19 neither permitted nor denied by best guess
20 record for domain of Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it)
21 smtp.mail=Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it
22 Date: Sat, 8 Mar 2014 15:49:54 +0100 (CET)
23 From: Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it
24 Subject: This is the spoofed message
Figure 4.8: Spoofed email address
conditions are satisfied. However, emails falling into the External Domain
case or sent from a valid internal address (e.g. as part of an insider attack
or following a mailbox exploitation) are hard to be marked as suspicious
without a context. The defence strategy needs to be adjusted basing on the
specific policies or conventions inside the company, for instance:
• Can email addresses be categorized basing on importance and risk?
Email address with high importance could be monitored with restric-
tive criteria.
• Which are common attachments file type in internal emails? Are
executable attached often or only PDF or CAD documents?
• Are attachment expected from external domains? If so can those do-
mains be listed? A company may usually accept documents from sup-
pliers from their mail server, but not from external domains.
• Is the analyst team allowed to manually process the email content? A
negative answer implies the request of authorization for every received
warning, introducing an additional delay in the detection time.
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1 #!/usr/bin/env python2
2 import httplib
3 import sys
4 import socket
5 import re
6 import Levenshtein
7
8 ip = sys.argv[1]
9 domain = sys.argv[2]
10 email = sys.argv[3]
11
12 # Reverse DNS query
13 real_domain = socket.gethostbyaddr(ip)[0]
14 # Equal domain level
15 level = 0
16 for e1,e2 in zip(reversed(real_domain.split('.')),
17 reversed(domain.split('.'))):
18 if e1 != e2:
19 break
20 level += 1
21 if level < 2:
22 print " [!] Different domain (" + real_domain + ")!"
23
24 # Reputation check using www.reputationauthority.org
25 h1 = httplib.HTTPConnection('www.reputationauthority.org')
26 h1.request('get', '/lookup.php?ip=' + ip)
27 resp = h1.getresponse()
28 data = resp.read()
29 h1.close()
30 # Obtaining the reputation as a number from 0 to 100 (max trust)
31 val = re.compile('images/([0-9]+)\.gif').findall(data)[0]
32 val = 100 - int(val)
33 if val < 60:
34 print ' [!] Reputation: '+str(val)+'/100'
35
36 # Hostname distance check
37 known_hosts = ['google', 'acme', 'yahoo']
38 hostname = re.compile('.*@(.*)\.\w+').findall(email)[0]
39 for h in known_hosts:
40 ratio = Levenshtein.ratio(hostname , h)
41 if ratio < 1 and ratio > 0.5:
42 print ' [!] Host similarity with ' + h
43
Figure 4.9: Sample code for domain name and IP reputation check
4.3.2 Executable and documents analysis
Malware are essential parts of an advanced attack and their detection is of
primary importance. A malware could be deployed by a direct link down-
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1 # Valid email domain, good reputation , good email address
2
3 $ ./check_sender.py\
4 192.168.66.55 mail.acme.it Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it
5
6 # Different email domain, poor reputation , good email address
7
8 $ ./check_sender.py\
9 192.168.100.100 mail.acme.it Daniele_Bellavista@acme.it
10 [!] The host has a different domain (web.ispnet.it)!
11 [!] Reputation: 15/100
12
13 # Different email domain, poor reputation , similar email address
14
15 $ ./check_sender.py\
16 192.168.100.100 mail.acme.it Daniele_Bellavista@acrne.it
17 [!] The host has a different domain (web.ispnet.it)!
18 [!] Reputation: 15/100
19 [!] Host similarity with acme
Figure 4.10: Example usage of check_sender.py. See figure 4.9
load, as email attachment or by physical interaction (e.g. from an USB
stick).
The analysis of malware deployed using an USB stick requires an host-
based IDS, while a NIST can analyze email attachments and downloads.
There are multiple file type to check:
• Portable executable and windows scripts - the most common
malware.
• Executable and linkable format and shell scripts - malware for
linux are rare can be part of a targeted attack.
• OS X applications and shell scripts - same for linux, OS X can
be infected as part of a targeted attack.
• APK, XAP, APPX and iOS Apps - also mobile device could be
targeted.
• Browser extensions and flash applications
• PDF documents - PDF may contains exploits and shellcodes.
• Office documents - can contain macros and exploits.
• Archives - an archive, especially if protected with a password, could
hide malware.
50 Defence strategies against targeted attacks
Common antivirus scan or dynamic malware analysis are needed, be-
cause they can identify opportunistic malware, but fails to detect targeted
attacks malware.
The theoretical solution is to perform a manual analysis of each file, but
it can’t be employed in the real world because of the high number of samples.
For instance ACME Corporation downloads every days about a thousand PDF
documents and a thousand executables.
My proposal is studied to work side by side with dynamic analysis, in
order to provide additional hints or warnings for the analyst team. The
detectors inspect the defence system events to identify suspicious activi-
ties. I have identified some detection approaches that can be retrieved from
download information, metadata and the dynamic analysis result:
• Source IP and Host: as for emails source IP, the host and IP of
the downloaded malware can be analyzed for reputation and similar
names. Host reputation, however, is a lesser indication than mail
reputation, because a neutral reputation can be accepted.
• Filename: a common social engineering technique is to create an
executable with a double extension (e.g. .doc.exe or .pdf_____.exe).
Also files called Invoice.exe or Important Document.exe are suspicious.
• Icon analysis: for executable files, another indicator is to check the
executable icon for similarity with document icons, such as PDF or
DOC icons.
• Metadata analysis: document metadata, such as comments, could
serve as a social engineering technique or may contains extra data for
a multistaged attack.
• Analysis on the analysis: dynamic analysis permits to extrapolate
key feature of the sample. Although the behavior may not results
suspicious, some behavior may need further analysis. A detector could
rise a warning if:
– Common sandbox detection: some bypass action are recorded
by the analysis. A warning could be the presence of behaviors
associated with sandbox detection techniques, especially if such
evasion works against the malware analyzer used in the company.
– Scan for files or process: another suspicious behavior can be
the scan for a particular file or process. This can be an indicator
of a multistaged attack.
– Presence of active code inside Documents: although legit
documents can contains active code or plugins, their presence
could lead to further investigation.
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4.3.3 Network communications
For each step trough the attack process, it becomes harder to detect a tar-
geted attack. A network communication detector aims to identify possible
C&C communications and data exchange. Thus, it’s essential to have de-
ployed a TSL inspection, otherwise the encryption would give an attacker a
chance to hide its communications.
The analysis of network communication is extremely dependent from the
company infrastructure and policies, but once the defence system is able to
analyze every communication, the analyst team could highlight on both
headers or content of the messages.
By looking at headers, the analyst team could identify suspicious com-
munications by looking at:
• Non-standard communication: communication of unexpected or
unknown protocols could indicate a malware activity. For instance,
file sharing or torrent protocols could be unexpected or UDP commu-
nication on non standard ports.
• Periodically visited websites: basing on the company policies, a
periodic visit of an unexpected website may be an indication of a
malicious activity.
• Host reputation: contacts to hosts with poor reputation can be a
suspicious activity.
Further detection could analyze the communications content for the presence
of:
• Document uploading
• Inconsistent content with protocol header
• Unexpected encrypted content inside the communication
4.4 HAZARD: Hacking Approach for Zealot Ad-
vanced Response and Detection
WASTE isn’t a complete solution against a targeted attacks. It strictly relies
on existing detection systems, and their deploy inside the company. An
expert attacker could completely bypass the defence system, neutralizing
the effectiveness of WASTE. Or, even worse, it could know the exact detection
methods and bypass them.
To provide a more comprehensive defence strategy, the organization
should offer a full-time service against targeted attack. I propose an ap-
proach called HAZARD (Hacking Approach for Zealot Advanced Response and
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Detection), aimed to provide security assessment inside a company. HAZARD
uses WASTE together with existing defence systems, to provide:
• Defence against opportunistic attacks: the work includes detec-
tion, evaluation and response plan against opportunistic attacks.
• Defence against targeted attacks: an team should actively analyze
events and warnings for clues of a targeted attack.
• Vulnerability Assessment: as part of the security service, the vul-
nerability assessment is offered for attack path detections and vulner-
ability notification.
• Targeted attacks as a service: this service may offers advanced
advices on the weak points of a company against targeted attacks,
together with refresher courses from an attacker point of view.
HAZARD is a business process with various groups and roles (described
in section 4.4.1) and subprocesses. In order to detect targeted attacks,
the HAZARD process must promote self-evolution and collaboration between
groups. Everything that is learned by a single role must become part of the
organization global knowledge, to gain the necessary flexibility when dealing
with targeted attacks. The subprocesses are:
1. Incident analysis: analysis and mitigation of incidents detected by
conventional defence systems (section 4.4.2).
2. WASTE warning analysis: analysis, correlation and possible mitigation
of warnings generated by WASTE (section 4.4.2).
3. WASTE issue management: analysis, fix and feedbacks for issues on
WASTE (section 4.4.4).
4. Vulnerability assessment: vulnerability management applied to the
company (section 4.4.5).
5. Targeted attack evaluation: analysis of weak points and attack
path from an attacker point of view (section 4.4.6).
6. Targeted attack test: penetration testing using targeted attacks
techniques (section 4.4.7).
4.4.1 HAZARD Roles
The process identifies three groups:
• Company IT: the company IT is a role that must be present in-
side the client company. It’s the point of contact with their system
administrators.
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• Detection Den (D-Den): the D-Den is the group assigned to the
attack detection. It consist in two roles:
1. Analysis Team (A-Team): the A-Team is responsible of ana-
lyzing the defence systems events and WASTE warnings to detect,
evaluate and report attacks. The A-Team can be the Analyst
Team actor of WASTE (see figure 4.1).
2. Detection Team (D-Team): the D-Team is responsible of
managing WASTE. In particular they have to correct, produce and
improve the warning detectors. The D-Team can be the Detection
Team actor of WASTE (see figure 4.1).
• Hacking Den (H-Den): the H-Den is assigned to perform vulnera-
bility assessment and targeted attacks. The H-Den is also composed
of two roles:
1. Vulnerability Team (V-Team): the V-Team is responsible of
performing vulnerability assessment, evaluation and fix plan for
the Company IT.
2. Hacking Team (H-Team): the H-Team performs evaluation
from an attack perspective, and organize refresher courses for
security experts and personnel.
4.4.2 Incident Analysis
Name Description
Incident detection Incident elaborated from any defence sys-
tem. It’s very likely to be an opportunistic
attack
Mitigation Plan The A-Team sent to the IT administrators
the Mitigation Plan artifact
Mitigation Result Once the mitigation plan is terminated, the
IT administrators should send the A-Team
the mitigation result.
Incident overview Overview of the incident after the analysis
Attack Feedback Knowledge on attacks methodologies gained
by analyzing the incident
Vulnerability Feedback Knowledge on vulnerabilities gained by an-
alyzing the incident
Table 4.3: Incident analysis events
The incident analysis process involves all roles (see figure 4.11). It rep-
resents the mitigation action against a standard incident detected by the
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Name Description
Internal Incident Re-
port
Report for internal use, generated after the
incident analysis. This report includes tech-
nical and exhaustive details.
Mitigation Plan Work plan for the threat mitigation. It con-
tains summary description, risk evaluation
and mitigation instruction for the company
IT administrators.
Internal Attack Analy-
sis Report
Report for internal use, generated from the
incident analysis. It includes details on how
the attack was performed. The goal of this
document is to learn new attack techniques.
Known vulnerability
list
Artifact that contains all the opened and un-
fixed vulnerabilities of the company.
Internal Vulnerability
Analysis Report
Report for internal use, generated from the
incident analysis. It includes details on
which vulnerabilities the attack exploited.
The goal of this document is to rank the
opened fix plans and to learn new attack
techniques.
Fix plan Similar to the mitigation plan, it contains
description, risk evaluation and fix plan for
the company IT administrators.
Table 4.4: Incident analysis artifacts
defence systems. Table 4.3 shows the process events description, table 4.4
shows the process artifacts description.
The process starts when the A-Team receives an Incident detection mes-
sage. The incident is analyzed and processed to produce an exhaustive report
of the attack and a mitigation plan. While the mitigation plan is sent to the
company IT administrators, the report is sent to the H-Team and V-Team,
who will respectively generate an attack report and a vulnerability report.
If the mitigation isn’t successful, both the mitigation plan or the incident
analysis could be erroneous. The A-Team is responsible to reiterate the
analysis process to understand what went wrong.
4.4.3 WASTE warning analysis
As the incident analysis, the warning analysis process also involves the par-
ticipation of all roles (see figure 4.12). It represents the analysis and cor-
relation of the WASTE warnings to obtain indication of a targeted attack. If
a T.A. is detected, then mitigation actions can be performed. Table 4.5
shows the process events description, table 4.6 shows the process artifacts
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Figure 4.11: HAZARD: incident analysis process
description.
The process starts when the A-Team receives a WASTE warning message.
The warning is analyzed to detect indicators of a targeted attacks. Then the
A-Team tries to correlate existing indicators to confirm a targeted attack.
At the end of the process, the D-Team receives a feedback on the warning,
to improve or fix WASTE detectors.
If a targeted attack is detected, the A-Team produces a report for the
company, the V-Team and the H-Team. The company has to remove the
threat, evaluate the attack damage and pursue legal actions, while the H-
Team and V-Team will respectively generate a a report about attack tech-
niques and about exploited vulnerabilities.
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Name Description
WASTE Warning Warning generated by the WASTE system.
Authorization Further analysis may have to access to re-
stricted or sensitive information. The A-
Team must ask for permission.
Permission Granted In reply to authorization message, it autho-
rizes the access to the required data.
Permission Denied The access to the required information is de-
nied. The A-Team must proceed the anal-
ysis basing on whatever data they have ex-
trapolated.
Mitigation Plan Work plan for the threat mitigation. It con-
tains summary description, risk evaluation
and mitigation instruction for the company
IT administrators.
T.A. Company Report Detailed report based on forensic evaluation
of the targeted attack. The company may
need it to pursue legal actions or to evaluate
the damage.
T.A. Report Detailed report of the Targeted attack sent
to the H-Team and V-Team for further anal-
ysis.
Warning Feedback Feedback on how the warning has been an-
alyzed and correlated with other indicators.
T.A. Feedback Knowledge on targeted attacks methodolo-
gies gained by analyzing the targeted attack
Vulnerability Feedback Knowledge on vulnerabilities gained by an-
alyzing the targeted attack
Table 4.5: Warning analysis events
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Name Description
Analyzed Warning List Opened and uncorrelated warnings already
analyzed by the A-Team.
T.A. Indicator List List of indicators extrapolated by the warn-
ings.
Internal T.A. Report Report for internal use, generated from the
analysis of warnings and indicators. It in-
cludes details on how the targeted attack
was performed. The goal of this document
is to expand the organization knowledge.
Internal Warning Re-
port
Report for the D-Team, generated from the
warning analysis. It includes details on how
the warning was used, which extra infor-
mation was required and so on. The ob-
jective of this document is to stimulate the
improvement of the WASTE system.
Mitigation Plan Work plan for the threat mitigation. It con-
tains summary description, risk evaluation
and mitigation instruction for the company
IT administrators.
T.A. Company Report Technical details and forensic results ob-
tained from the analysis of the targeted at-
tack. The report is meant to be used for
legal purpose and damage evaluation.
Internal T.A. Analysis
Report
Report for internal use, generated from the
targeted attack analysis. It includes details
on the attack process. The goal of this docu-
ment is to learn new attack approaches and
to understand the company weak points.
Social Engineering Re-
port
Report for internal use, generated from the
targeted attack analysis. It includes more
details on the social engineering approaches
used from the targeted attacks. The goal of
this document is to provide policy improve-
ment in the company.
Known vulnerability
list
Artifact that contains all the opened and un-
fixed vulnerabilities of the company.
Internal Vulnerability
Analysis Report
Report for internal use, generated from the
targeted attack analysis. It includes de-
tails on which vulnerabilities the attack ex-
ploited. The goal of this document is to rank
the opened fix plans and to learn new attack
techniques.
Fix plan Similar to the mitigation plan, it contains
description, risk evaluation and fix plan for
the company IT administrators.
Table 4.6: Warning analysis artifacts
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Figure 4.12: HAZARD: warning analysis process
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4.4.4 WASTE issue management
Name Description
WASTE issue detected Event generated by the monitoring of the
WASTE system and caught by the D-Team.
Overview and related
warning of the issue
The D-Team send to the A-Team an
overview of the issue and the warnings that
may be effected.
Issue Feedback The A-Team replies to the D-Team a feed-
back on the issue.
Table 4.7: WASTE issue management events
Name Description
Analyzed Warning List Opened and uncorrelated warnings already
analyzed by the A-Team.
T.A. Indicator List List of indicators extrapolated by the warn-
ings.
Internal T.A. Report
List
List of analyzed targeted attacks.
Issue Report Report on the issue, containing an exhaus-
tive description of the issue, its fix and the
feedbacks from the A-Team.
Table 4.8: WASTE issue management artifacts
The WASTE issue management process is part of the continuous improve-
ment of the detection system. When the D-Team identifies an issue or in
WASTE detectors, it must fix it, send a feedback to the A-Team which will
analyze the affected warnings, indicators and reports. This operation gen-
erates a feedback to be sent back to the D-Team. If the issue is solved, a
report is compiled and the issue is solved. Otherwise the issue must reiterate
the fixing process.
The process is shown in figure 4.13, while table 4.7 shows the process
events description and table 4.8 shows the process artifacts description.
4.4.5 Vulnerability Assessment
As part of the complete security service, the D-Team performs periodic scans
of the internal and external systems, in order to find known vulnerabilities
and evaluate them. Once the scan results are ready, the D-Team deter-
minates new vulnerabilities, producing a report and a fix plan for each of
them. If some vulnerabilities are already known, it may happen that fur-
ther knowledge had made necessary to reevaluate and change the risk level.
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Figure 4.13: HAZARD: WASTE issue management process
Name Description
Periodic Scan Periodic event that determinates when a
scan should be launched.
Scan results Obtained by the vulnerability scanners.
Contains a list of vulnerability present in the
system.
Vulnerability Feedback The D-Team sends to the organization a
feedback on the vulnerabilities, in order to
increase the organization knownledge.
Table 4.9: Vulnerability assessment events
In such case, a new report and fix plan must be compiled and sent to the
Company IT administrators.
The process is shown in figure 4.14, while table 4.9 shows the process
events description and table 4.10 shows the process artifacts description.
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Name Description
Known vulnerability
list
Artifact that contains all the opened and un-
fixed vulnerabilities of the company.
Internal Vulnerability
Analysis Report
Report for internal use, generated from the
incident analysis. It includes details on
which vulnerabilities the attack exploited.
The goal of this document is to rank the
opened fix plans and to learn new attack
techniques.
Fix plan Similar to the mitigation plan, it contains
description, risk evaluation and fix plan for
the company IT administrators.
Table 4.10: Vulnerability assessment artifacts
4.4.6 Targeted attack evaluation
Name Description
Planned Evaluation Periodic event for the planned attack evalu-
ation.
Attack Evaluation Re-
port
Contains the description of possible ex-
ploitable vulnerability, attack path and
spreading techniques seen from an attacker
point of view. Each element or group of el-
ements has an associated risk. The report
is needed by the Company IT administrator
for technical and administrative evaluation.
Attack Evaluation
Feedback
The H-Team sends to the organization a
feedback on the evaluation of the targeted
attack, in order to provides new point of
view for each activity.
Table 4.11: Targeted attack evaluation events
The targeted attack evaluation is one of the two hacking services per-
formed by the H-Team. Periodically, the H-Team evaluates possible attack
paths, by starting with an information gathering phase. Then, the H-Team
supposes to be inside the company and analyzes internal vulnerabilities to
find possible spreading approaches and APT techniques. Finally, for each
scenario, the attack risk is evaluated and the H-Team send report to the
Company IT administrators. As always, the H-Team sends to the other
teams feedbacks on the attack.
The process is shown in figure 4.15, while table 4.11 shows the process
events description and table 4.12 shows the process artifacts description.
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Figure 4.14: HAZARD: vulnerability assessment process
4.4.7 Targeted attack test
The targeted attack test is the second hacking services performed by the
organization. With a longer period than attack evaluation, the H-Team try
to perform a real targeted attack against the company. The H-Team may
use any knowledge gathered during the attack evaluation process to design
possible attack paths, malware or exploits.
The targeted attack can succeed or even fail, meaning that the H-Team
could not bypass the defence measures. In either case the H-Team comiles
an exhaustive report for internal use and a report for the company. The
latter must also include a comparison with the other attacks to understand
what changed and what not.
The process is shown in figure 4.15, while table 4.11 shows the process
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Name Description
Known external vul-
nerability list
Artifact that contains all the opened and un-
fixed vulnerabilities of the company external
systems.
Known internal vul-
nerability list
Artifact that contains all the opened and un-
fixed vulnerabilities of the company internal
systems.
External Knowledge Knowledge gathered using information
gathering techniques from the outside.
Social engineering ap-
proach list
Possible approaches that can be developed
basing on the external knowledge.
Attack approach list Possible approaches that can be developed
basing on the external knowledge.
Spreading and APT
approach list
Possible approaches that can be developed
by analyzing the internal vulnerability and
the attack path. The spreading approaches
include ways for the attack to infect more
valuable hosts, while the APT approaches
include methods for advanced, persistent at-
tack.
Attack evaluation re-
port
Contains an evaluation of possible complete
attack process with associated risks for data
and services disclosure, disruptor and so on.
This artifact is meant to be read and eval-
uated by advanced company IT administra-
tors.
Table 4.12: Targeted attack evaluation artifacts
Name Description
Planned targeted at-
tack test
Periodic event for the planned targeted at-
tack test.
Attack test report The H-Team send to the Company IT ad-
ministrator the attack test report.
Attack test feedback The H-Team sends to the organization a
feedback on the targeted attack, in order to
provides new point of view for each activity.
Table 4.13: Targeted attack test events
events description and table 4.12 shows the process artifacts description.
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Figure 4.15: HAZARD: targeted attack evaluation process
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Name Description
Known external vul-
nerability list
Artifact that contains all the opened and un-
fixed vulnerabilities of the company external
systems.
Known internal vul-
nerability list
Artifact that contains all the opened and un-
fixed vulnerabilities of the company internal
systems.
External Knowledge Knowledge gathered using information
gathering techniques from the outside.
Social engineering ap-
proach list
Possible approaches developed during the
T.A. evaluation process.
Attack approach list Possible approaches developed during the
T.A. evaluation process.
Spreading and APT
approach list
Possible approaches developed during the
T.A. evaluation process.
Delivery techniques Evaluated using all the available knowledge,
they include all possible attack vectors and
delivery techniques for all or part of the
weapons.
Weapons Malware or software to be used during the
attack. Basing on the attack vector, the
weapon will be packed inside a deliverable,
such as a zip or PDF document.
Attack test internal re-
port
Contains details on the targeted attacks.
How it failed or succeeded, any problems
and results.
Attack test internal re-
port list
Previous report of targeted attacks.
Attack test report Contains the description of the attack, how
it succeeded or how it failed. In case of suc-
cessful attack, the report include how deep
the infection went and what a real attacker
could had achieved. The report contains
also comparison with previous attacks.
Attack evaluation re-
port
Contains an evaluation of possible complete
attack process with associated risks for data
and services disclosure, disruptor and so on.
This artifact is meant to be read and eval-
uated by advanced company IT administra-
tors.
Table 4.14: Targeted attack test artifacts
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Figure 4.16: HAZARD: targeted attack test process
Chapter 5
Defence strategy application
After performing the targeted attack described in section 4.1, my work
moved to analyze and defend the ACME Corporation infrastructure.
The next sections report the application description, used tools and re-
sults of the HAZARD process phases. In section 5.1 I describe the defence
process against opportunistic attacks and their mitigation, in section 5.1.3
the defence against targeted attacks, while in section 5.2 I report the ap-
proach to vulnerability assessment.
I didn’t perform the HAZARD phases targeted attack evaluation and test,
because they would required more technical evaluation and lot of paperwork.
5.1 Defence against and mitigation of cyber at-
tacks
The defence against attack was based on events created by automatic defence
systems. ACME Corporation used an installation of FortiGate, which is an
application firewall (see section 3.2.2) to provide policy enforcement and an
installation of Lastline to monitor the network.
I created also some WASTE detectors, to narrow the search of suspicious
communications and malicious downloads.
5.1.1 Lastline
Lastline is a network intrusion detection system (see section 3.3), aimed to
analyze both the objects that enter a network and the traffic being generated
by the internal hosts[25]. Lastline is composed by three components:
Sensor: soft appliance that collects incoming artifacts (documents and ex-
ecutable downloaded or received as email attachments), identifies ma-
licious behavior in network traffic, collects statistic about network
traffics and optionally blocks malicious network activities[25].
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Manager: soft appliance that collects artifacts and information from sen-
sors and presents them to the user. The Manager also sends to the
Engine the received artifact for analysis. It’s also responsible of catego-
rize and prioritize the events using an incident-centered approach[25].
Engine: soft appliance responsible for the analysis of artifacts. It uses a
proprietary sandbox based on Anubis[25].
5.1.2 Incident monitoring, evaluation and mitigation
The incident monitoring had two objectives:
1. Remove existing malwares - Some hosts had been infected before
the installation of Lastline, or they were compromised by other means.
For instance mobile computer can be infected before being plugged to
the network. Figure 5.1 shows an example of malicious events being
detected by Lastline.
2. Detect new malware downloads - New downloaded malware must
be rapidly detected and removed from the host before they can spread
or communicate with the C&C. Figure 5.2 shows an example of mali-
cious downloads analyzed and reported by Lastline.
3. Detect suspicious downloads - Some downloaded malware are re-
ported by Lastline as non-malicious, despite being harmful. These
samples can be either new malware variants or even targeted malware.
4. Detect suspicious communications - As for downloads, Lastline
could underestimate the score of some communication. However, since
Lastline registers only suspicious communications, further analysis re-
quires a particular attention. For instance a moving laptop or the ex-
piration of the DHCP leasing time can break some automatic analysis.
For each incident or malware download, I had to produce a mitigation
plan to be sent to the company IT administrators. Each plan has a score,
computed basing on the following parameters:
• Host owner and role: C-team hosts and production server, for in-
stance, should have a higher priority.
• Lastline score: score automatically assigned to the incident by Lastline.
• Machine type (desktop, laptop or server): an infected laptop
can spread the infection also by physical relocation.
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Figure 5.1: Malicious events detected by Lastline
• Incident status: gives an indication of the effective threat. It can
be confirmed or blocked, meaning that the malware can communicate
with the C&C or if their communications are blocked by the peripheral
systems. The incident status should be related to the machine type.
A laptop with a blocked malware, once outside the company network,
could communicate with the C&C.
When dealing with malware downloads, however, the score plan is differ-
ent. First of all, a download reported as malicious could be overrated, thus
a manual check of the dynamic analysis is always required. Second, a down-
load doesn’t imply the machine is infected, only that the sample has been
downloaded. Incidents relying only on malicious download need to be care-
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Figure 5.2: Malicious downloads analyzed by Lastline
fully analyzed.
Figure 5.3 shows the number of infection events per week since the in-
stallation of Lastline. I immediately started analyzing events and infection,
and deployed the first mitigation reports at the end of the week. The de-
pression of the end of December is related to the Christmas holiday period.
Back from vacation, the mitigation continued, keeping the infection under
control. The peak of the first week of February was caused by a new mal-
ware, which spread across the network, causing a large number of events
and incident. However, it was quickly contained and mitigated.
Although the number of events was reduced, it was never brought to
zero, because of some installation and administration problems that both
prevented me from identifying some infected hosts and prevented the ACME
Corporation IT administrators from cleaning others.
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Figure 5.3: Number of infection events per time
5.1.3 Defence against targeted attacks
Most of my work was dedicated to clean the existing threats, but I wrote
some WASTE detector to pinpoint suspicious downloads. I couldn’t write de-
tectors for emails because the Lastline mail analyzer was not activated.
Also, I didn’t perform analysis of network communication because of the
same problem mentioned before: some network traffic sources were hidden
behind some proxies and most of the hosts where managed by DHCP. Au-
tomatic detection based on Lastline events was hard to implement.
When checking for downloads, I focused on those identified by Lastline
as being in order to find elusive malware. At first, I had to analyze the
download statistic of ACME Corporation to understand which the habits were
and how to reduce the samples to analyze. On average, ACME Corporation
downloads 900 executables, where:
• 20% are updates from Microsoft and Google.
• 1% are downloads from known web sites (e.g. Skype).
• 50% are downloads from the internal ACME Corporation network.
• 15% are from the external ACME Corporation network.
• 10− 12% are downloads from external clients sites.
• 2− 4% are downloads from other websites.
Most of the downloaded samples came from trusted or internal network,
which can be used in case of a targeted or insider attacks. Thus I separated
WASTE detectors in three modalities:
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• Other websites: WASTE fires warnings very often. These samples are
in low number and came from a totally untrusted network.
• Client external websites: they can be a good entry point for tar-
geted attacks; however their number is too high for a deeper analysis.
Thus, WASTE raises warnings basing on narrow criteria.
• Company websites: the majority of downloads comes from here.
Most of the samples are internal applications or libraries, which have
similar characteristics and behavior. I programmed WASTE detectors to
detect any anomaly, thus excluding most of the similar samples.
During my brief work as analyst, I didn’t detect trace of targeted mal-
ware, however, WASTE detectors allowed me to identify some malware pro-
grams that weren’t recognized by Lastline, or by antivirus programs.
5.2 Vulnerability Assessment
The vulnerability assessment was a relevant aspect of the work. By using
OpenVAS, we detected known vulnerabilities or systems misconfiguration and
performed a penetration testing.
5.2.1 OpenVAS
The Open Vulnerability Assessment System is a framework offering a vul-
nerability management solution[6]. The system is composed by clients (the
OpenVAS user interfaces), services and data. There are three services:
• Scanner: the scanner executes a set of Network Vulnerability Tests
(NVTs), which are tester for a single vulnerability.
• Manager: the manager manages the scan plans, organizes results and
configurations and communicates with the clients.
• Administrator: the administrator permits the user and feed man-
agement.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future
Research
Targeted attacks are an actual threat, for big and small companies. My
work, along with other reports, demonstrates their potential risks: without
the need of expensive founding an attacker can compromise the targeted
company, by leaking sensible data or disrupting their services. The economic
loss for the target can be very high.
Targeted attacks are capable of eluding conventional defence approaches,
which rely on signature detection and follow a vulnerability-based taxonomy,
without taking into account the entire attack process. Both academic and
professional researches are studying the concept of targeted attack to pro-
vide new defence solutions. However, the real effectiveness of the proposed
methods is hard to demonstrate.
My thesis defined an approach that can be used prior to the definition
of a detection method. HAZARD and WASTE allow an immediate deploy inside
a company, because they rely on existing defence systems, thus maintaining
the same infrastructure. Once the process starts, the continuous testing and
information exchange between the security team permits a company to en-
hance its cyber security by detecting threats and preventing some attacks,
thanks to the proactive discovery of vulnerabilities and entry paths. Also,
the process allows the definition of tests and monitoring to secure any infras-
tructure. For instance the security teams can easily deal with legacy server
as well as SCADA systems and mobile devices.
HAZARD encourages the exchange of knowledge to improve the work of
every team, so that any security flaw can be analyzed and fixed. Such
knowledge can also be capitalized by an additional research and develop
team, which can analyze the problem from a higher-level prospective to
provide new systems and methods for defending against targeted attacks. In
addition, the company could use the attack and analysis reports to prepare
training program for the personnel.
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I’m aware of the possibility of administrative limitations, for instance
about privacy and classified information, or about any other requirement or
problematic. However, HAZARD can be easily extended and adapted to handle
these kinds of scenarios. Another problem is the excessive freedom given by
WASTE. Nothing prevents the D-Team to write fully signature-based warn-
ings, especially as a way to reduce false-positives. This modus operandi is
counter-productive and can mine the analysis work. HAZARD tries to prevent
this behavior with the H-Team work: if they can bypass the detection meth-
ods, the D-Team will be encouraged to improve or rewrite the detectors.
6.1 Future research
Future researches related to my work regards WASTE architecture, HAZARD
feasibility, HAZARD effectiveness and new approaches based on HAZARD results.
WASTE doesn’t have a proper architecture; it’s only a conceptual frame-
work. However, by defining suitable requirements followed by a problem
analysis, WASTE could become a generic warning provider, capable of inter-
facing with any defence system and operate on any infrastructure.
HAZARD feasibility regards administration and organizational problems.
The process still need to be fully deployed inside a company, with multiple
people arranged in separated teams. Only then HAZARD could be redefined
to increase its flexibility and adaptability.
As for every defence product, the effectiveness must be verified. HAZARD
must be properly tested against a targeted attack. However, how to tell if
a security system is secure against a targeted attack? A related research
should answer this question, by defining external testing process capable of
verifying the defence approaches.
Finally, the ultimate goal of HAZARD is to promote the study and the
development of advanced strategies against targeted attacks. If security
teams are allowed to create a common shared pool composed by attacks
information, WASTE detectors and methods born from HAZARD, it can be used
by the security researchers to better analyze the targeted attack problem
and provide new methodologies to counter the threat.
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